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INTRODUCTION 
Space shuttle mission schedules and economics require a short ground turnaround 
time. On the basis of present plans, no more than 10  days after the vehicle's return 
from a mission of up to 30 days' duration are available for ground verification (vehicle 
checkout and repair). 
Ground verification of the complex subsystems that exist today is anything but an 
exact science. This is particularly t rue  of vehicles that operate in space o r  at high 
altitudes. Many of the malfunctions that occur in flight are difficult or  impossible to 
I reproduce o r  simuiate on the gruliiid. 
I 
Onboard monitoring in real time is one way to improve mission reliability and safety 
~ 
I 
and reduce ground verification time. Many theoretical studies and several laboratory 
investigations have dealt with this subject, but almost no flight data are  available, par- 
ticularly for the flight environment with which this paper is concerned. 
I To acquire such data a flight program in which an analog onboard monitoring system 
was installed on a YF-12 airplane w a s  begun. The four separate but interrelated goals 
of this program were to: 
(1) Determine the technical feasibility of onboard in-flight data monitoring, failure 
detection, and failure isolation. 
(2) Develop a credible base of data with which to evaluate the operational value of 
an onboard monitoring system. 
(3) Investigate the man/machine interface to determine the extent, form, and 
method of data presentation most acceptable and meaningful to operating and mainte- 
nance crewmen. 
(4) Establish baseline data for comparisons between conventional ground checkout 
and onboard monitoring systems with respect to the operational comprehensiveness of 
preflight testing. 
The program has three phases, the first of which is discussed herein. The objec- 
tives of Phase I were to: 
(1) Develop diagnostic test logic and decision criteria from flight data and establish 
the comprehensiveness of the possible decision criteria. The test logic and decision 
criteria are intended for use in succeeding phases of the program to verify the feasi- 
bility of failure detection and failure isolation by means of in-flight data monitoring. 
(2) Provide in-flight data to the ground crews to  assist the maintenance operation. 
This is in partial fulfillment of the second, third, and fourth program goals. 
This report describes the hardware and results associated with Phase I of this pro- 
gram. 
ONBOARD MONITORING SYSTEM 
The onboard monitoring system used in Phase I was an airborne integrated mainte- 
nance analog data recording system. Figures l(a) and l(b) show the elements of the 
onboard monitoring system and the flow of data. Figure l(a) represents the airborne 
systems, and figure l(b) shows ground-based data reduction equipment. Analog sensors 
continuously monitored equipment performance. 
After the system acquired a signal, usually through a transducer, the signal went to 
a remote unit (shown in figs. 2(a) to 2(c)) where it was conditioned and multiplexed. The 
signal was then sent to a 16-track magnetic tape recorder. 
The recorder electronics assembly, the recorder itself, and the remote multiplex 
signal conditioner weighed 77.6 kilograms (171 pounds) and occupied 0.076 cubic meter 
(2.68 cubic feet) of volume. The system required 2.5 amperes at 28 volts. It had no 
unusual environmental requirements. Seventy-three parameters, which a re  listed in 
table 1, were monitored. The system was  capable of recording up to 12 hours of contin- 
uous flight data. 
After  each flight the tape was removed and processed on the ground. The recovery 
equipment played back the tape and formatted the data on a new tape for processing by a 
general purpose computer. 
SIGNAL CONDITIONING 
The signals listed in table 1 were conditioned in the remote unit (fig. l(a)). The 
signal conditioning converted each signal to  a 0 to 2 Vdc voltage level. These signals 
were then multiplexed and sent to one of 13 voltage-controlled oscillators in the elec- 
tronics assembly. The oscillators converted the conditioned signal to a proportional 
frequency-modulated (FM) signal of 266.6 hertz to 433.3 hertz. The FM multiplexed 
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signal was then recorded on one of the 13 data tracks of the magnetic tape in the recorder 
assembly. Voiced communications were recorded on the fourteenth track. 
The other two tracks on the 16-track tape were reference tracks. One track 
recorded clock reference pulses, which enabled the ground processing equipment to 
demultiplex the signals. The other track recorded a fixed-frequency reference so that 
the data reproducing and digitizing equipment (fig. l(b)) could compensate for errors  
introduced by temperature variations and tape motion. 
The data reproducing and digitizing equipment was used to decommutate the recorded 
data, digitize them, and record them digitally in time sequence. The equipment also 
had the amplifying and smoothing circuitry necessary to drive up to 50 channels of strip 
chart recordings. 
DATA FORMAT 
The data reproducing and digitizing equipment reproduced data in two forms: analog 
signal outputs that could be directly recorded on strip charts of up to 50 channels at a 
time, and digital magnetic tape which contained time-sequenced data in a digital format 
that could be read with a general purpose digital computer. 
Data were reproduced and used in three forms. Time history strip charts were 
available the first or  second day after the flight for a quick look at anomalies and simple 
fault analysis. 
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able from information that had been processed in a general purpose computer. Data in 
this form a re  more difficult to analyze. However, the measurement of anomalies in any 
particular time span is more precise. For the more difficult problems, cross  plots of 
two channels of flight data were displayed on an X-Y plotter. Cross plots were also 
valuable for identifying meaningful performance decision criteria for online monitoring 
systems in later phases of the program. 
(A typical fault analysis that used the strip charts is described in a 
0 J---- I -&--  A:-: 0 1  n v i n t n q l t  nf paoh ngrnmptpr was avail- 
SELECTION OF SUBSYSTEMS TO BE MONITORED 
One of the critical decisions in this project was the selection of the subsystems to be 
monitored. The task of monitoring each subsystem was beyond the scope of this project 
in terms of both cost and need. 
The engine inlet and portions of the electrical and fuel management subsystems were 
chosen for monitoring because (1) they are complete and relatively independent systems 
where cause, effect, and maintenance actions can be easily measured and classified; 
(2) the test point access is relatively simple, and the number of test points required for 
diagnostic purposes is relatively small compared to a subsystem such as  the inertial 
navigation system; (3) the failure rates of these systems are  potentially high, and many 
of the failures a re  of the type that cannot be reproduced on the ground; and (4) the test 
signals pertinent to these subsystems (hydraulic pressures, mechanical movement, 
digital signals, analog signals, air data signals) encompass almost all the test signals 
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I that exist in airborne vehicles. 
RESULTS 
Data from 16 flights were collated, compiled, and verified for reasonableness. The 
data a re  representative of the entire flight envelope of the monitored subsystems. Pre- 
liminary data analysis did not disclose any obvious areas of uncertainty or  unexplain- 
able phenomena, so the data were  judged to be suitable for the development of prelimin- 
ary diagnostic test logic and decision cri teria for the second phase of the program. The 
data were subsequently used to develop the in-flight test logic for Phases I1 and ID, par- 
ticularly for the selection of logic levels and constraints. 
The onboard monitoring system was also used to provide data to ground crews for 
flight-to-flight aircraft maintenance. Twenty-three malfunctions were identified with 
the monitoring system during the 16 flights, four of which could not have been detected 
in normal ground checks. Eleven malfunctions were detected which could have caused 
a future flight to have been aborted if they had not been identified and corrected. 
DISC US S IO N 
The YF-12 airplane was selected as the flight-test vehicle for the onboard monitor- 
ing system because it normally flew every 7 to 12 days at the NASA Flight Research 
Center and therefore simulated the shuttle schedule and environment more closely than 
any other available vehicle. 
The test points in the engine inlet system, which was the most important subsystem 
monitored, were oriented toward ground tests. A s  the program developed, this 
seriously limited the acquisition of the data required for in-flight analysis. The problem 
was partially solved later in the program by reworking the inlet computer to bring out 
more meaningful intermediate test points; this gave the experimenters a better idea of 
the internal functioning of the subsystem. 
This problem illustrates the fact that in-flight systems monitoring and diagnosis is 
different enough from ground testing to require the monitoring of different parameters. 
The choice of parameters should be made during the subsystem design phase, when it is 
relatively easy to provide access to them. 
The most common manifestation of a malfunction o r  an anomaly in the engine/inlet 
system is an aerodynamic disturbance. Aerodynamic disturbance is a purposely general 
term which covers such anomalies as engine compressor stalls and improper inlet shock 
wave location. Only considerable analysis reveals the cause of the disturbance, so the 
term is used until analysis is complete. 
Five examples of the use of the onboard monitoring system are described below. 
(1) The flight plan called for an increase to a rather high angle of attack and then a 
pushover to more normal flight conditions during an acceleration at a reasonably high 
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Mach number and altitude. Aerodynamic disturbances occurred in both engines. Analy- 
sis by the onboard monitoring system indicated that compressor stalls had occurred 
because of the high angle of attack. The pilot decreased the angle of attack and went 
through standard procedures for restoring the engine to normal operating conditions. 
Ground checks verified that no malfunction had occurred. 
(2) An aerodynamic disturbance also occurred during an acceleration as the airplane 
made a turn. The onboard monitoring system indicated that the inlet spike had not 
moved to the proper position for the maneuver. Replacing the manual spike control cor- 
rected the problem. 
(3) After another flight, data from the onboard monitoring system indicated that the 
pumps in one of the fuel tanks had cycled on and off several times when there were 
reliable indications that the tank was empty. On the basis of these data, the scavenge 
pump was  replaced. Laboratory tests verified that the pump failed intermittently. 
There is no way to test the operation of the scavenge pump in this airplane on the ground 
except in the laboratory. 
(4) The onboard monitoring system indicated that one of the two fuel boost pumps did 
not operate during a particular flight. Investigation revealed that the pump float switch 
had failed in the open position. This condition could have caused an engine flameout if 
a high fuel demand had been made on the left engine. 
(5) Figure 3 shows an anomaly in the right spike position trace. This anomaly indi- 
cated a malfunction because under normal conditions there would have been a correspond- 
ing anomaly in the left spike position trace. The malfunction could have been an actual 
up**'" -.,;La m n T r p m p n +  A I L " .  -*A*---" nr zn interm-ittent transducer signal. Since the inlet did not unstart, and 
the forward bypass door did not react, as it would have if there had been a quick spike 
movement, there appears to have been a malfunction or an interruption in the circuit. 
There was  no comment by the pilot on the malfunction. 
These examples represent a savings in manpower and demonstrate the versatility 
of the onboard monitoring system. In the first incident, the system showed that the 
disturbance was  caused by a maneuver rather than by a malfunction, saving hours of 
unnecessary troubleshooting. In the second example, the system made it easier to pin- 
point the location of the malfunction. The pump failure in the third incident could be 
detected only during flight. The boost pump failure in the fourth example might have gone 
undetected for several flights, a situation which could have become serious under cer- 
tain circumstances. 
The advantage of fault analysis using the strip charts is demonstrated by the fifth 
incident. The number of times the onboard monitoring system identified problems 
which could only be detected in flight is a fair indication that the information it made 
available to the ground crews w a s  adequate to meet their maintenance requirements. 
The preliminary data analysis reported here did not disclose any obvious areas of 
uncertainty or  unexplainable phenomena. Only these data were used to develop the in- 
flight test  logic, including the selection of logic levels and constraints in Phases I1 and 
111. 
The primary objective of Phase I of this program was to provide baseline data to be 
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used for  developing diagnostic test logic and decision cri teria for Phase 11, and this 
objective w a s  met. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An analog onboard monitoring system was installed on a YF-12 airplane to monitor 
the engine inlet and portions of the electrical and fuel management subsystems. 
The data provided by the system constituted a suitable base for diagnostic test logic 
and decision criteria for the remaining two phases of the program. 
The data were adequate for the purpose of maintaining the engine inlet and identify- 
ing malfunctions in it. Data requirements for onboard monitoring and diagnostic analy- 
sis differ from those for ground-based maintenance to such an extent that the parameters 
to be analyzed must be selected during the design phase of the subsystem to be monitored. 
Flight Research Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Edwards, Calif., September 21, 1973 
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Figure 3. Strip chart data showing anomaly in right spike position trace. 
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